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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA M. BURNHAM, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
BANKERS LIFE & 
CASUALTY COMPANY, 
an Illinois corporation, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12261 
Originally this was an action commenced by 
Mrs. Patricia M. Burnham to recover as beneficiary 
under a reinstated $10,000 whole life insurance pol-
icy and an attached $40,000 decreasing term rider 
issued by respondent to Dr. Preston J. Burnham, de-
ceased. The case previously came before this Court 
when plaintiff and appellant appealed from an order 
granting the defendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. (R. 
57, 58). Plaintiff and appellant's second appeal to 
this Cour't is from an Order denying a Motion For 
Summary Judgment made after the case was re-
manded for trial following the first appeal. ( R. 95). 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The first appeal to this court was from the 
granting of a Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 
22) made by the defendant in the trial court. The 
Honorable Merrill C. Faux granted that motion on 
two grounds - First: under Utah Code Annotated 
' Section 31-22-18(2) the insurance company had the 
right upon reinstatement of the policy to" ... exclude 
or restrict liability to the same extent that such lia-
bility could have been or was excluded or restricted 
when the policy or contract was originally issued, and 
such exclusion or restriction shall be effective from 
the date of reinstatement;" and second that "Dr. 
Burnham's failure to disclose (previous visits with a 
psychiatrist) prevented the insurer from exercising 
its right to evaluate what it might have learned from 
Dr. Fowler and to apply the restriction to the rein· 
stated policy, and that this failure to disclose was a 
misrepresentation by omission and a fraud upon the 
insurer." (R. 56, 57). Plaintiff appealed from the 
granting of defendant's Motion For Summary Judg· 1 
ment (R. 68) and in Burnham vs. Bankers Life & 
Casualty Company, 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P. 2d 261 
( 1970) this Court held that the trial court erred in , 
granting the Motion For Summary Judgment and · 
that the case should be 
" ... remanded with the disposition in 
accordance with this opinion." 470 P. 2d at 
261. 
Plaintiff then filed a Motion For Judgment 
2 
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(R. 76) which was denied (R. 78) and a Motion For 
Summary Judgment (R. 79) on grounds that 
" ... there are no issues of material fact 
?-nd that plaintiff is entitled to a summary 
Judgment as a matter of law in accordance 
with 1the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court 
on June 2, 1970, and reported as 470 P. 2d 
261." (R. 79) 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment was 
heard on September 21, 1970, and denied by the Hon-
orable Marcellus K. Snow ( R. 95) . From a denial 
of her Motion For Summary Judgment plaintiff com-
menced the present appeal (R. 97, 106). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court's 
denial of plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment 
and instruction from this Court for the court below 
to proceed with a trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Court will recall from the Burnham opin-
ion, supra, that plaintiff, Mrs. Preston J. Burnham, 
initially instituted this action to recover as benefici-
ary under a $40,000 decreasing term rider attached 
to a $10,000 whole life insurance policy issued by de-
fendant, Bankers Life & Casualty Company, to Dr. 
Preston J. Burnham. The $40,000 term rider lapsed 
on April 1, 1967 because Dr. Preston J. Burnham 
failed to pay the premiums. The basic $10,000 whole 
life policy continued in force, however, because it was 
3 
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supported by premiums paid from the cash reserve. 
On June 28, 1967, Dr. Burnham filed for reinstate-
ment of the policy and paid the premiums which were 
then in default. Upon the death of Dr. Preston these 
~re~iums were returned to the plaintiff without pre-
JUd1ce to her right to bring this action. The defendant 
paid the basic coverage of $10,000 provided in the 
policy but refused to pay the amount claimed to be 
due under the term rider because Dr. Burnham had 
failed to list Dr. Herbert B. Fowler as a physician 
whom he had consulted when he applied for reinstate-
ment of the $40,000 term policy. 
A deposition taken of Dr. Fowler disclosed that 
Dr. Burnham had consulted with Dr. Fowler on a 
professional basis with respect to marital difficulties 
eighty times during the period from February 13, 
1963 to November 9, 1965 (Dep. Dr. Fowler, p. 11). 
During certain consultations with Dr. Fowler, Dr. 
Burnham made such statements as "I wish I were 
dead" or "I would be better off dead" (Dep. Dr. Fow-
ler, p. 24). On February 20, 1968 Dr. Burnham did 
in fact commit suicide. 
By Affidavit of its attorney, Don J. Hanson, de-
fendant asserted that had it known about Dr. Burn-
ham's visits with Dr. Fowler, and particularly the 
expressions made by Dr. Burnham during those con-
sultations, it would not have renewed the $40,000 
rider (R. 24, 25). Based upon this Affidavit, the 
pleadings and 'the deposition of Dr. Fowler, def~n­
dant moved for a summary judgment (R. 22), which 
4 
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Motion was granted, and a Memorandum Decision 
was issued by Judge Merrill C. Faux on November 
14, 1969 (R. 56). The trial court concluded that un-
der Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-22-18(2) the 
insurance company could 
" ... exclude or restrict liability to the 
same extent 'that such liability could have been 
or was excluded or restricted when the policy 
or contract was originally issued, and such 
exclusion or restriction shall be effective from 
the date of reinstatement." ( R. 56) 
It was also held by the trial court that the failure of 
Dr. Burnham to disclose his visits with Dr. Fowler 
constituted a "misrepresentation by omission and a 
fraud upon the insurer" (R. 56). From the trial 
court's granting of defendant's Motion For Sum-
mary Judgment plaintiff appealed to this Court (R. 
68). 
In Burnham vs. Bankers Life & Casualty Com-
pany, 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P. 2d 261 (1970) this 
Court held that the trial court erred in granting de-
fendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and re-
manded the case for ''disposition in accordance with 
this opinion" (R. 74), 470 P. 2d at 265. It was also 
held that Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-22-18(1), 
which provides 
"A reinstated policy of life insurance or 
annuity contract may be contested on account 
of fraud or misrepresentation of facts mater-
ial to the reinstatement only for the same per-
iod following reinstatement and with the same 
5 
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C?nditio~s and exceptions as the policy pro-
y1~es ~1th respect to contestability after or-
1gmal issuance" 
did not govern this case since the original policy was 
issued in 1962 and the statute was enacted in 1963. 
This Court further held that 
''An application for reinstatement is (not) 
an offer to enter into a contract to reinstatf: 
the old policy but is merely a step to compiy 
with the conditions specified by the company 
in the reinstatement clause of the insurance 
contract." 470 P. 2d at 265. 
On remand the plaintiff moved first that a judgment 
for the plaintiff be entered, which was denied (R. 
78), and then moved for summary judgment (R. 79). 
From an Order denying plaintiff's Motion For Sum-
mary Judgment (R. 95) the present appeal was com-
menced. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE INCON-
TESTABILITY CLAUSE OF'THE POLICY WAS 
RENEWED BY THE APPLICATION FOR RE-
INSTATEMENT. 
As we understand the opinion of this Court in 
Burnham vs. Bankers Life & Casualty Company, 24 ' 
Utah 2d 277, 470 P. 2d 261 (1970), the reinstate-
ment aplication did not in contemplation of law con-
stitute a new contract but merely a continuation of 
6 
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the original policy. The opinion did not dispose of the 
question as to whether the incontestability clause of 
the original policy was revived by reinstatement of 
the policy. The incontestability clause of the policy 
provides: 
"This policy shall be incontestable after 
it has been in force during the lifetime of the 
Insured for 2 years from its date of issue, ex-
cept for nonpayment of premiums, and except 
as to provisions relating to total and perman-
ent disability benefits and provisions granting 
additional insurance specifically against death 
by accident, if any." (R. 9) 
We cannot agree that Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 31-22-18 ( 1), "was undoubtedly a legislative 
response to a serious omission in the law ... " 470 P. 
2d at 265. To the contrary, most of the nation's courts 
have held that where a policy has been in force and 
the two-year contestability period has run, the con-
testability clause runs anew when the policy has been 
reinstated, and the period begins from the time of re-
instatement even though no statute is involved. The 
courts in the majority of jurisdictions have reasoned 
tha:t reinstatement either effects a new contract of 
insurance, the terms of which are determined from 
the policy as originally issued, or renews the original 
contract in full with all of its terms. Consequently, 
the incontestability clause runs anew from the date 
of reinstatement. The effect of this line of reasoning 
is that the insurer may on grounds of fraud or other 
material misrepresentation contest the policy as re-
7 
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instated within the time limit as specified in the con. 
testability clause of the policy as issued, and follow. 
ing the expiration of such time is prohibited from 
making further contest. Thus, in Lanier vs. New 
York Life Insurance Company, 88 F. 2d 196, (5th 
Cir. 1937), Cert. denied 301 U.S. 693 (1937), where 
the incontestable clause agreement provided that · 
"This policy shall be incontestable after two years 1 
from its date of issue except for nonpayment of pre-
mium," the court held that the insurer had two years 
from the date of reinstatement to contest the policy. 
In New York Life Insurance Company vs. Seymout, 
45 F. 2d 47 (6th Cir. 1930), it was held that a two-
year incontestable clause in a life insurance policy 
though not specifically made applicable in case of a 
reinstatement of the policy after a lapse might fairly '
1 
be construed as having taken fresh effect when the ' 
policy again came into force by a reinstatement; and 
that the right to contest because of fraud in the rein-
statement would expire two years after the date of 
reinstatement. The court stated that while this con-
clusion could not be predicated upon any precise lan-
guage in the policy, it was a reasonable inference as 
to what the parties intended by reinstating a policy 
containing an incontestable clause. 
In McCary vs. John Hancock Mutual Life In-
surance Company, 236 C.A. 2d 501, 46 Cal. Reporter 
121, 23 ALR 3rd 733 ( 1965), the incontestable clause 
provided that a llfe insurance policy's supplementary 
provision for family income should be incontestable 
8 
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after it had been in force during the lifetime of the 
instffed for two years from the date of issue except 
for nonpayment of premiums. An application for re-
instatement of the policy was filled out after two 
years from the date of issue and contained a false 
representation by the insured as to his health. The 
insured died three months later, and it was contend-
ed by the beneficiary that the two-year limitation 
period in the clause barred the insurer after the ex-
piration of the period from contesting the truthful-
ness of the insured's representations in the applica-
tion for reinstatement. The court held that the insur-
er was not barred by the incontestable clause from 
defending against the reinstatement which it allowed 
in reliance upon the insured's representations. 
Other courts have held that reinstatement is a 
contract to reinstate or revive the contract of insur-
ance as issued, but that the incontestable clause be-
comes no part of the contract for reinstatement. As 
a result under such decisions, the insurer may contest 
the contract to reinstate upon grounds of fraud or the 
like at any time without reference to the incontest-
able clause in the policy as issued. The contract for 
the restoration of the policy like any other contract 
may be attacked at any time for fraud or other ma-
terial misrepresentation in procurement without re-
ference to the incontestable clause in the original pol-
icy. 
In McMahon vs. Continental Assurance Com-
pany, 308 Ill. App. 27, 30 N.E. 2d 959 (1940), the 
9 
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p.olicy ~on.ta~ned provisions for reinstatement at any 
time w1th1n its terms upon written application accom. 
panied by evidence of insurability satisfactory to the 
insurer. The policy also contained a clause to the ef-
fect that the policy should be incontestable after two 
years from its date of execution except for nonpay-
ment of premiums. The court in that case held that 
although 'the policy had been in force for more than 
two years when it lapsed for nonpayment of pre-
miums, the insurer could urge as a defense to a re-
covery by the beneficiary that the reinstatement of 
the policy after it had lapsed was procured through 
fraudulent representations in the application for re-
instatement, such a defense not constituting a contest 
or attack on the original policy but upon contract for 
the reinstatement thereof. The court further said 
that inasmuch as the insurer was induced to reinstate 
the policy of insurance as a result of the fraud of the 
insured, the policy was never in fact or law reinstated 
and that it necessarily foll'owed that the situation 
was the same as if no contract for reinstatement was 
ever entered into. 
In Acacia Midual Life Association vs. Kaul, 114 
NJE 491, 169 A. 36 ( 1933) neither the orginal policy 
nor the contract of reinstatement contained any pro-
vision limiting attack upon the reinstatement to the 
contestable period fixed in the policy. The court said 
that the reinstatement of the policy was neither the 
issuance of a new policy nor the reissuance of the or-
iginal policy but merely a waiver of the lapse of the 
10 
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original policy and the reinstatement thereof in full 
force, including the incontestable clause. The court 
held that the reinstatement could be attacked for 
fraudulent procurement notwithstanding the expir-
ation of the limitation period of the incontestable 
clause in the original contract. The court noted that 
no contest could be made as to fraudulent misrepre-
sentations in the original issuance of the policy since 
the one-year period of contestability had expired. 
It is respectfully submitted that this court did 
not intend to overrule the case of Gressler vs. New 
York Life Insurance Company, 108 Utah 173, 156 
P. 2d 212 (1945), which squarely holds that an in-
surance company is entitled to make a fair investiga-
tion of an insured prior to reinstating the policy. We 
submit that this Court's opinion in Burnham vs. 
Bankers Life & Casualty Company, supra, cannot be 
construed to deprive insurers of their right to investi-
gate the insurability of an applicant upon application 
for reinstatement of a policy, a conclusion which the 
appellant has attempted to assert in the present ap-
peal. We respect£ ully urge this court not to adopt a 
rule which would immediately revive an insurance 
policy upon the mere submission of a reinstatement 
application regardless of whether the application con-
tained misrepresentations of material fact or fraud-
ulent statements. 
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IL 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DR. BURN-
HAM FURNISHED EVIDENCE OF INSURA-
BILITY SATISFACTORY TO THE INSURER 
WAS NOT DISPOSED OF IN BURNHAM VS. 
BANKERS LIFE & CASUALTY COMPANY, 24 
UTAH 2d 277, 470 P. 2d 261 (1970). 
i 
We take issue at the outset with appellant's a\. ' 
legation that the "only defense to payment relied up-
on by defendant" is by way of a provision in the re-
instatement applicati1on (Brief of Appellant, p. 6). 
Defendant's Amended Answer alleges: 
" ... that at said time and place the de· 
ceased made a material misrepresentation of 
material facts and that if said facts had been 
known to the defendant at said time, said pol-
icy would not have been reinstated." (R. 15) 
Contrary to appellant's assertions, we rely on the 
language of the "reinstatement" clause contained in 
the original policy. That clause states: 
''This policy may be reinstated (unless 
previously surrendered for its cash value) at 
any time within 5 years after default in pre-
mium payment, upon furnishing evidence o.f 
insurability satisfactory to the Company, and 
the payment of all past due premiums with in-
terest compounded at 5 % per annum ... " (R. 
9) (Emphasis added) 
It is our contention that Dr. Burnham's failure tc 
disclose the nature and extent of his visits with Dr 
Fowler constituted a material misrepresentation oJ 
material facts which made it impossible for the in 
12 
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surance company to determine whether satisfactory 
evidence of insurability had in fact been furnished 
by Dr. Burnham. As this Court pointed out in Burn-
ham, siipra, and in Gressler vs. New York Life In-
snrance Company, 108 Utah 173, 156 P. 2d 212 
(1945) 
" ... under Utah law a life insurance pol-
icy with a clause providing for reinstatement 
after lapse for nonpayment of premiums upon 
presentation of evidence of insurability satis-
factory to the insurer, is not entirely termin-
ated upon def a ult of the premium payment, 
for the insured has a contractual right under 
the policy to reinstate fully upon compliance 
with the conditions for reinstatement contain-
ed in the policy." 470 P. 2d at 264. (Emphasis 
added) 
It was further stated: 
" ... By the reinstatement clause, the in-
sured was given an absolute right to reinstate 
upon payment of the amount in default and 
production of evidence of insurability satis-
factory to the company." Id. (Emphasis add-
ed) 
This Court further emphasized the contingent rather 
than absolute right of an insured to reinstate a policy 
as follows: 
" ... Under the reinstatement clause the 
insurer was accorded the right to require what-
ever evidence of insurability it deemed satis-
factory and ~ f ai; oppor_tunity to 1}Wke a com-
plete investigatwn. prior to r~instatement. 
When the insurer fmally determmed that the 
13 
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condition~ ~or rein~tatement had been fulfil]. 
ed, the origm!ll pohcy was again in full force 
and effect as if there had been no prior lapse 11 
Id. (Emphasis added) · 
This Court could not have made i't more clear that the 
right to reinstate a lapsed insurance policy is contin-
gent upon the insured's furnishing evidence of insur. 
ability satisfactory to the company and that the com- ' 
pany has the right to make a complete investigation 
of such evidence prior to reinstatement. 
It was further noted in Biirnham, supra, that 
the granting of a summary judgment was improper , 
because there remained disputed issues of material 1 
fact: 
"First, unless the misrepresentations in 
the negotiation for an insurance policy are 
made with intent to deceive and materially af-
fect either the acceptance of the risk or the 
hazard assumed by the insurer, the insurance 
contract cannot be avoided by an insurance 
company. Mere falsi'ty of answers to questions 
propounded are insufficient if not knowingly 
made with intent to deceive and defraud. Sec-
ond, whether or not a misstatement in an ap· 
plication is material to the risk, while it is for 
the jury to determine, depends n?t upon what 
the insurer or the insured may thmk about ~he 
materiality or the importance of the.false. m· 
formation given or the true informa~10n w1!h· 
held but upon what those engaged m them· sur~nce business, acting reasonably and nat~r­
ally in accordance with .the usual pract~c.e 
among insur::mce compames under such en· 
cumstances, would have done had they known 
14 
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the truth, that is, whether reasonably careful 
and intelligent men would have regarded the 
facts stated as substantially increasing the 
chai:ices of the happening of the event insured 
agamst so as to cause a rejection of the appli-
cation." 470 P. 2d at 263. 
Although it was respondent's belief in the first 
Burnham appeal that reasonable minds could not dif-
fer on the question of whether Dr. Burnham's failure 
to disclose eighty visits with a psychiatrist was inten-
tional and material to the risk, this Court rejected 
that argument, pointing out that these were ques-
tions "for the jury to determine." Id. Appellant in 
her Brief at page 7 recognizes that there are fact 
issues remaining for trial, but asserts that respon-
dent is precluded from raising those issues because 
it relies solely on the language contained in the re-
instatement application. We disagree. We do not be-
lieve this Court intended to hold that an insured has 
the absolute right to reinstate a lapsed insurance pol-
icy notwithstanding misrepresentations of material 
facts contained in the reinstatement application. Such 
a rule would completely nullify the reinstatement 
clause of the policy, which states that reinstatement 
is contingent upon the insured's furnishing evidence 
of insurability satisfactory to the company. More-
over, it is clear that an insurance company must be 
given a fair opportunity to make a complete investi-
gation of an insured prior to reinstatement, and the 
company must rely on the accuracy of information 
contained in the application, as it did in the case of 
15 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
?r. Burnham. If such inf0rmation is false or mislead. 
Ing and the company relies on the information in re-
instati~g a policy, it should certainly be given an op-
portumty to assert that the insured failed to furnish 
satisfactory evidence of insurabiilty as required by ' 
the original policy. Any other rule would completely 
nulli'fy the language in the reinstatement clause. 
In Gressler vs. New York Life Insurance Com-
pany, supra, the Court specifically held that the mere r 
filing of an application fer reinstatement did not of 
itself revive the policy. The Court stated: 
"We cannt)t ai:eept this view that when the 
applicant filed' he application to revive togeth-
er with the necessary papers accompanying it, 
and 'there the-;,_, eJ~isted no valid objection to the 
form or ::mbst1;,nce of such application, or pa-
pers or the pro,;f furnished therewith' the Com-
pany could 'dr. but one thing, viz., revive the 
policy.' ( Fmp~msis added) The condition for 
reviving the policy was not only the presenta-
tion at 'the Horne Office of evidence of insura-
bility but such evidence 'satisfactory to the 
company.' 'This did not mean that answers. to 
questions submitted by the Company which 
would show insurability must be accepted by 
the Company, nor that the qompany ~?uld 
not ask further questions. This phrase sat-
is'f actory to the Company' imp.lies that the 
Company must have _opport~mty ~o deter-
mine whether the evidence is satisfactory 
to it and that means an opportunity to 
conduct an investigation to determine whe-
ther the answers were correct or wheth~r 1 
the investigation disclosed further matters m 
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regard to which the Company may desire to 
interrogate the applicant." 163 P. 2d at 329 
Thus an insurance policy does not automatically 
become reinstated upon the mailing of an application 
forrn, nor at any other time before the insurance com-
pany has had an opportunity to make an investiga-
tion of the insured. The reason for a question in the 
reinstatement application form which requires the 
insured to list physicians with whom he has consulted 
is so that the insurance company may investigate and 
determine the nature of the treatment given by the 
physicians. An insurance company would have par-
ticular interest in visits made by an insured to a psy-
chiatrist, especially where suicidal expressions were 
made. It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that 
there were a numberof issues which were not resolved 
by the Burnham opinion and which were left to the 
determination of the trial court. These factual ques-
tions include (1) whether Dr. Preston J. Burnham 
committed a fraud upon the insurance company when 
he failed to disclose eighty prior visits with Dr. Fow-
ler; ( 2) whether the omission by Dr. Burnham was 
intentional; ( 3) whether the omission was material 
to the risk; and ( 4) whether a reasonably careful and 
intelligent insurer would have rejected Dr. Burn-
ham's application on the basis of the omission. In 
view of the remaining issues, the trial court did not 
err in refusing to grant plaintiff's Motion For Sum-
mary Judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the Burnham opinion that 
this Court did not intend to nullify the incontestabil-
ity clause or the reinstatement clause of Dr. Burn-
ham's original policy which states that reinstatement 
is contingent upon the furnishing of evidence of in-
surability satisfactory to the company. Language by 
this Court in the Bitrnhani opinion makes it absolute-
ly clear 'that the only issues decided in the first appeal 
were ( 1) that the trial co:.irt erred in granting de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment because is-
sues of material fact rem2.ined for trial; (2) that 
Section 31-22-18 ( 1) which allows an additional con-
testability period after reinstatement was not appli- , 
cable; and ( 3) that the reinstatement application did 
not constitute an offer to make a new contract of in-
surance but was simply a step toward compliance 
with the conditions specified in the reinstatement 
clause of the original insurance contract. 
It is submitted that this Court did not by its 
decision attempt to decide any questions of fact nor 
did it attempt to state what law should govern the 
case except with respect to Section 31-22-18(1) and 
the nullified provision in the reinstatement applica-
tion. Respondent, therefore, submits that the trial 
court properly denied plaintiff's motion for summary 
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judgment and that the case should be set down for 
trial to determine those questions off act set out in the 
Burnham opm10n. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
Don J. Hanson 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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